Liability for Risk
Traditionally, claims for compensation oftransnational environmental damage had to be basecl on the concept of state responsibility and, more precisely, on the rule of due 
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https: //doi.org/10.20378/irbo-51905 diligence. lt is accepted that liability exists for failure to observe international obligations but the doctrine leaves many questions unanswered. For example, before states become responsible for damage caused to other states customary international law requires that there be a breach ofan established international obligation. lt is frequently difficult, in the absence of clear and binding obligations established by treaty, to determine that any obligation exists in a particular case. The doctrine of state sovereignty over territory and the resources therein has predominated. Even if an obligation can be evidenced or implied, such as a duty to take care in carrying out certain activities, states may be held liable only if they are negligent, i.e. at fault in failing to observe the standard of care required (due diligence). These standards are frequently hard to identify or vaguely expressed, or their legal status may be controversial if they are formulated in terms of'guidelines' or 'codes ofconduct'. Attribution to states offailures to act on the part of their state organs or officials also poses problems.
lt is, moreover, not yet clear, in the absence of treaties, that states can be held absolutely or strictly liable for their damaging activities, even if they engage in ultrahazardous enterprises, or those with a forseeable risk of damage, such as operating nuclear or other power stations, using ships to transport oil and other hazardous or noxious cargoes, disposing of toxic wastes, exploiting seabed resources or outer space. etc.
In spite of the increasing number of cases of transnational environmental damage, compensation thus is in fact paid only very rarely. Furthermore, payment is normally based not on customary international law but on regimes for certain specific areas of transnational pollution established by liability conventions or it is paid 'ex gratia' 1 i.e. without acceptance of the formal obligation to compensate.
Partly this might be due to the vagueness of customary law as outlined above. An increasing amount of industrial activity has escaped the rule of due diligence, 2 as advanced technological development involves a huge amount of risk for accidental transnational environmental damage. The risk inherent in complex industrial processes can be minimized but not completely avoided.
3 As long as a breach of a rule of international law is a necessary prerequisite for a claim of compensation, the source activity has tobe classified as prohibited by international law, entailing the consequence that it may not be continued legally.
4 lt is, however, a general concern of states to avoid exactly this consequence for activities they consider necessary, or at least profitable, for their economies. Therefore, states normally avoid accepting the obligation to pay compensation for transnational environmental damage.
Consequently, the economic costs of dangerous activities are externalized. Some scholars emphasize the distribution of wealth as the primary objective of liability and hold that an externalization of costs is a deprivation ofrights and amenities ofthe victim in favour of the benefit of the risk-creator. 5 Others focus on the preventive function of an increased obligation to compensate transboundary environmental damage 6 and imply that the risk-creator will invest additional resources in preventive measure when costs of accidental pollution are intemalized. Both arguments require liability to be strengthened. The burden of proof should no longer rest on the victim. In other words, the traditional system of fault-liability should be replaced by one of strict or absolute liability 7 at least for so-called 'ultra-hazardous' 8 activities.
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Several authors believe that the concept of international liability should be developed on the basis of establishing a general obligation of strict or absolute liability for environmental damage as a primary rule on international law.
10 Apart from the general desirability of strengthened liability for environmental damage, on what evidence, however, is this theory founded?
First of all, its proponents produce several prominent cases of international dispute settlement. These are, however, only of doubtful value regarding the development of a general obligation to strict international liability.
11 More importantly, it remains to be proved that 'a few partly isolated and hardly representative'
12 decisions of international tribunals rendered in specific political situations in the field of environmental disputes provide an appropriate basis from which to derive legal norms capable of influencing today's political decision-makers. For 'the interests and aims of States ... explain why particular rules and principles are created and why they are (or are not) carried out'.
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Secondly, an increasing amount ofinternational conventions governing third-partyliability in specific fields seems to corroborate this theory. lt is true that all these conventions are based on the principle of strict and absolute liability and thus avoid the necessity of proving the breach of a rule of international law prior to a claim for compensation. Not all of them, however, are concluded in order to tighten the legal remedy for the benefit of victims. And not all of them contain an obligation of international liability (i.e. liability hetween states).
No doubt, international conventions reftect the intention and the view of political decision-makers in a much more realistic way than do isolated coun decisions. They establish detailed regimes intended generally to govern liability disputes in the specified field. They are, furthermore, the result of co-operation between government officials and 14 This article tries to investigate the direction in which the international conventional law of liability for transnational environmental damage is currently developing. lt attempts to introduce into the discussion of the development of general rulcs ofliability the parameter ofthe economic and historical background ofthe respective conventions. The general importance ofthis parameter for the analysis ofintemational law has been pointed out elsewhere, 1~ but a detailed analysis of this aspect has, to our knowledge, not been carried out to date.
II. Private Liability Regimes in Conventional International Law
In regard to the political, ecological and economic circumstances, the civil liability regime for oil pollution damage 16 is a precedent for several international conventional regimes goveming liability for transnational environmental damage. The accidental grounding ofthe tanker 'Torrey Canyon' in 1967 Jed to a major oil spill in the English Channel and faced the British govemment with large expenditure 17 in clean-up costs as well as in reimbursement to private victims and regional entities. Liability according to traditional private maritime law amounted to only $48.
18 The then lntergovemmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO), now known as the 1 MO, undertook at the request of the British government, a study of the possible consequences of the disaster. Among the subjects identified by the 1MC0 Council for immediate scrutiny was the issue of increased liability, which required investigation of: 'all qucstions relating to the nature ( whether absolute or not), extent and amount ofliability of the owner or opcrator ofa ship or the owner ofthe cargo Uointly or severally) for damage caused to third parties by accidents suffered by the ship involving the discharge of persistent oils or other noxious or hazardous substances and in particular whether it would not bc advisable (a) to make some form of insurance of the liability compulsory; (b) to make arrangements to enablc governments and injured parties tobe compcnsated for the damage due to the casualty and the costs incurred in combating pollution ofthe sea and cleaning poll u ted property .
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Already this initial mandate for 1 M C 0 the newly established Legal Committee clarified for whose benefit the inquiry was tobe undertaken. Be the injured parties and those who bad incurred expenditures in clean-up costs governments or private persons, 
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The mandate indicated also that increased liability was--at least in part-to be placed on private industry involved in the dangerous business concemed, which should be compelled to cover the risk by insurance. 21 States did not seriously discuss the possibility of placing international liability on the flagstate of a damage-prone tanker. The proposal of Liberia, a state representing a major 'fiag on convenience', that states should consider the possibility of multilateral governmental relief action instead of putting the burden on the hard-pressed shipping industry 22 and a suggestion that national relief funds 23 should be set up were unsuccessful. They did not reftect the fact that it was the British State that had initiated the project in order to be better compensated for damage and clean-up costs alongside British coasts. 1 t was obvious that neither proposal met this goal. Therefore the international community was not prepared to assume joint international liability.
Once it was decided, in accordance with the views of the oil2 4 and the shipping industry,~ that Iiability was to be concentrated ('channelled') onto the owner of the tanker, the prime questions concemed the maximum amount of the damage to be insurable 26 and thus made acceptable, and whether liability was to be strict or based on fault with a reversal of the burden of proof 27 This dispute reftects the two camps into which states participating in the negotiations were divided. Whereas maritime nations, desiring to protect their national industry against a heavy additional liability burden, favoured a rather restricted approach, coastal states, confronted with great economic hardship arising out of the dangerous activity, were not prepared to agree to a solution leaving them bearing part of the costs involved. Here we are faced with a typical confrontaion of interests in negotiations aiming at shifting the economic risk arising from dangerous activities.
To resolve this situation, the idea was born of establishing an International Fund financed by the oil industry to provide new funds for compensation.
28 Again there was no discussion of direct participation in the Fund ofstates themselves. 29 States did not even 20 Thus rhe disrribution ofwealth and amenitics was the primary argumcnr for thc liability regimc, whcrcas thc re-cnforccment of prcvcnrion prior IJJ an aa:idml was to be achicved by a numbcr of administrative and tcchnical mcasurcs.
21 Thus guaranrccing thc financial asscu as a ncccuary countcrmcasure against 'onc-ship-companics', sec D. The 1MC0 Council had included within its mandate an inquiry into possible restrictions of passage through certain dangerous straits and areas by ships carrying certain dangerous or noxious cargoes.
31 This inquiry never took place and one may doubt whether it would have been acceptable to the majority of delegations participating in 1MC0, given their generally favourable attitude to the maritime transport industry. lt might however explain the fairly eo-operative attitude ofmajor oil companies towards acceptance of an increased liability.
lt is true that later the 1978 'Amoco Cadiz' casualty disclosed the insufficiency of the funds available 32 and that in a few other cases refundable claims had had to be apportioned. 33 This does not mean, however, that the private liability system has reached its limits. 34 States have reacted by concluding additional protocols, 35 primarily extending both the available amount of compensation and reducing the clauses of exemption.
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The private-financed oil pollution liability scheme was the first of its type. lt heavily inftuenced several subsequent approaches to the negotiation of other Iiability regimes. The so far unsuccessful attempt to extend the private liability regime to maritime transport of dangerous substances other3 7 than oil would combine the obligations of the ship owners and cargo interests in one treaty. Being an extension of the oil pollution regime, it is not surprising that states again were not prepared to engage in any liability scheme. 38 A similar project regarding inland transport of dangerous goods 39 is, nonetheless, currentJy being negotiated in the Economic Commission for Europe.
Another attempt to establish the private strict liability of the risk-creating industry concerned, is, on the basis of the liability regime for oil pollution damage, related to North Sea offshore oil drilling activities. 40 Oil companies reacted to the demand by 30 The US and West-German proposals that did not obligc the Fund to indcmnify nationals from countries whosc oil industry did not pay contributions, thlll making control of timcly payment a national wk, were not adoptcd: sec comments to articlc 13, concluding another 'voluntary' liability regime. 41 Again there was no discussion of any participation in the scheme by the licensing states.4
2 On the contrary, the international convention was eventua1ly virtually aborted because it did not improve the situation of victims, including coastal states, as compared to the compensation available to thcm under the existing regime based on a combination of remedies under both the applicable national laws and OPOL providing an easy and quick procedure though limiting the amount of available compensation, between which the victim has to choose.
States with a strong private-owned industry (primarily western states), are still not prepared to accept liability for damage arising out of private activities under their control. The developments of the past two decades indicate, however, that this does not necessarily mean that no compensation is available. On the contrary, between the two layers existing in theory, i.e. private liability according to national law and international liability, a third layer has been introduced. Here states accept the obligation to develop international law in order to assure the necessary means ofrecourse. They negotiate and conclude on this behalf international agreements governing liability and compensation issues. The financial burden, however, is placed on the branches and enterprises--private or state owned--creating the risk. In cases where enough financial assets are available, this might, from the environmental and economic point ofview, weil be the best solution as externalization of economic risk is avoided not only on the state level, but, according to the 'polluter pays' principle, also on the level ofbranches and activities creating the risk.
The attitude of the state community to developing the issue of liability for transboundary environmental damage, especially on this new layer, is reflected in two international instruments not confined to liability issues. During the 1972 Conferenceon the Human Environment, which took place only a few months after the convention establishing the exclusively private-financed Oil Pollution Compensation Fund bad been adopted, states were not able to agree on international liability for transboundary environmental damage. They merely accepted in principle 22 of the Oeclaration of Principles, the obligation 'to co-operate to develop further the international law regarding liability and compensation for the victims ofpollution and other environmental damage' . 43 There is no indication that this wording indicated the development of liability exclusively on the international level. The formulation offers at least the possi bili ty of developing the international law ofliabili ty on the model of the oil poll u tion compensation regime, i.e. on a privately financed level. One commentator explicitly considers the oil pollution compensation regime tobe an example of the development of that principle.
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In this connection, a last minute amendment to the Declaration is of interest. The draft principle on liability was originally worded as including 'liability and compensation in respect of damage to the environment4 5 and thus might have included claims regarding the injury to state sovereignty which would have to be compensated necessarily by the source state. The version adopted excludes precisely this kind of im material injury and This interpretation is corroborated by the wording of the principal article of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea concerning state responsibility regarding the maritime environment 46 as it explicitly mentions privately financed means of compensation. The article reftects the incohate general state of the law on international liability, stipulating only that states shall be liable 'according to international law', 47 though they must 'ensure that recourse is available in accordance with their legal systems'. Below the level of international liability, the convention introduces a general obligation of states to develop the means of compensation on a private basis. Eventually, states are obliged to develop both the international and the transnational levels ofrecourse for damage to the marine environment. Obviously inßuenced by the oil pollution compensation regime, 48 the convention in fact introduces a median layer based on both a concerted action of states and on private finance, that is distinct from the bottom layer of private recourse according to national law and from the top layer of international liability. lt is remarkable that there was agreement to circumvent the so far unsuccessful development of detailed norms governing international liability 49 and to introduce instead a new level ofliability facing less resistance.
International Liability in Conventional Regimes
Apart from the 'private' liability approach, several conventions in the areas of nuclear and space law stipulate different forms ofinternational liability. We will now investigate whether they offer precedents for the development of a general obligation of international liability for transboundary environmental damage.
lt is true that five conventions on liability for transnational nuclear damage 50 introduce the standard of absolute liability combining private and international elements, but reducing the analysis of the liability regime to these characteristics 51 means losing sight ofthe policy objective ofthe treaties. For the regimes contain two other far more crucial elements. The conventions introduce the system of 'channelling' liability, 46 i.e. concentrating all liability onto the operator of a nuclear installation, thercby abolishing any liability of any other possible defendant that might otherwise have been in issue. They also stipulate a severe limitation ofliability resu)ting in only a Jow amount of compensation actually being available in case of damage. lt was these two lauer elements that led to the adoption of the conventions.
Western European govemments that desired to develop the peaceful use of nuclear energy were heavily dependant on US suppliers. In the USA these suppliers had already achieved a discharge of the high and incakulable risk of liability involved. By contract, and later by law, 52 the governmental operator ofthe first atomic energy plants agreed to assume the entire liability in order to induce private companies to participate in the technological development ofthe new energy.
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In Western Europe the development of nuclear energy might potentially have been hampered un1ess the introduction of a similar rule excluded liability of the suppliers.s. Thus all liability was channelled to the operator5 5 as had been done in the USA. Against this background it is not surprising that the liability of the operator bad to bc absolute,~ as every exception might open a loop-hole for undesirable recourse against persons other than the operator und er ordinary la w. I t explains furthermore why there is practically no provision for a right of recourse for the operator against suppliers and others.
Three major interest groups participated in the OEEC expert meetings preparing a draft treaty on this subject. Western European states were eager to develop a promising source of energy; suppliers insisted on preclusion of liability on their part, 57 and European insurance companies tried to minimize the incalculable risk that they would have to undertake. 58 All were interested in the development of nuclear energy and elaborated a regime acceptable to their particular interests. Hence, deliberations took place without any representation of the interests of possible private or state victims. One of the major factors of negotiations aiming at increasing liability for environmental damage, the conflict ofinterests between risk creators and possible victims, was therefore missing.
The contracting parties of the resulting Paris Convention intended to adopt only one part of the VS system and thus placed a limited and insurable private liability onto the operator. Not being able toagree upon the US modeJ ofadditional government financed c_ompensation, states were prepared to place onto the public of countries the burden of the largest part of the risk. 59 Acceptance of sufficiently high private liability would have precludecl the need to adopt an additional layer of international liability . 60 The limit of private liability was, however, so low6 1 and so disproportionate compared to the damage of a possible accident, as well as compared to the huge investments in nuclear installations, that suppliers feared some Iiability would occur on their part in spite of the requirement of channelling.
62 Again there was a threat that the nuclear energy programme would be hampered by the Iiability issue.
The süppliers' pressure 63 and not the victims' interest is the reason for the eventual agreement on conclusion of the Brussels Supplementary Convention, which obliges the licensing state of a risk-prone installation to provide assets constituting another layer of compensation and establishes a fund financed by all contracting states constituting a third layer of compensation.
Hence, the combined Paris/Brussels regime was not intended to improve the situation of possible victims but to regulate the international law of liability for transnational nuclear damage according to the needs for unhampered technological development. Primarily the influence of the suppliers made states accept a government financed compensation scheme reinforcing the system of channelling. The intention of the conventions was thus a general limitation ofliabilities both in regard to the amount of compensation and to the parties liable.
We should briefly mention the transport liability convention, an even better example of this general intention. Operators of nuclear plants are, according to the Paris and Vienna Conventions (similar to the Paris Convention, but concluded at a global level), absolutely liable for all damage occurring in connection with their activity, including damage during carriage of nuclear material. However, in 1960 drafters were not prepared to intervene in the separate body of private maritime law64 and did therefore not exclude shipowners from liability. Whereas the absolute but severely limited liability of the new nuclear energy law extended to maritime transport of nuclear material, the rule channelling did not. 65 The limited absolute liability of the operator as compared to (in some cases) the unlimited liability of the shipowner made maritime transport of nuclear material virtually impossible 66 unless a contractual obligation was assumed by the concemed is lt was their way amwering thc question of 'how much of this risk should be bome by the operator ... , how much by thc individuals who suffcrcd thc damagc, and finally to what cxtcnt should states make availablc public funds for compcnsation', Explanatory Memorandum' (n 55), para 6. 60 The major obstaclc waa not thc crcation of additional liability itsdf, but its intmr.alioMl clcmcnt.
61 t5m USS with a possiblc rcduction by national law to not lCM than 5m USS, whcrcall combincd US-liability was up to 5oom USS. 62 Thcy prcsscd for atatc participation, sec Arangio-Ruiz, 'Somc International Legal Problems ofthe Civil Usc of Nuclcar Encrgy ', RKJUi1daOntrs107(1962-lI1) , 599.
6! Hence Hand! (n 9) 56o, is mistakcn when attributing thc subsidiary state liability of the nuclear liability oonvcntions to 'thc statc's ultimate control over the transnationally hazardous activity and thc benefit it prcsumably derives from it'. lnstcad, the rationale behind subsidiary state liability is but an economic cvaluation without rcgard to those exposed to risk. 64 See explanation of Explanatory Memorandum (n 55), para 34-35. 6!I Whereas a 'supersession' clausc in the Nuclear Ship Convcntion stipulates its priority over othcr transport agreemcnts, this dausc is missing in thc Paris and Vicnna Convcntioru. Evcn such a clausc howcvcr would not havc bccn able to avoid all conftict.s betwecn thc two laW3. thereby expressively circumventing his privilege of limitation. 68 Interested in both ensuring the economic benefit of maritime transport and the operators' privilege of limitarion ofliability, Western European states and the USA negotiated in co-operation with maritime and nuclear interest groups a short Convention, simply channelling all claims to the Paris/Brussels regime. 69 Its only purpose is to avoid any liability of shipowners in relation to maritime transport of nuclear material. Hence, it simply limits Jiability according to international nuclear law with no substitute compensation for the lost additional liability 70 under private maritime law. lt thus simply bridges a gap left open by the Paris and Vienna conventional regimes.
The parties negotiating in Paris, Brussels and later on in London were industrialized countries from a relatively homogenous region and had therefore similar interests. The Vienna Convention, negotiated on a global Jevel, Jacked these favourable conditions. Socialist countries did not depend on US supplies. Developing countries were divided into two groups, with some considering themselves exclusively as purchasers of nuclear equipment and therefore demanding a liability of suppliers and some considering themselves purely as victims and hence demanding high amounts of liability. Thus, the conference had to settle on a minimum level, introducing the principles of the Paris Convention with an amount of compensation not lower than a derisory $5 million.
lt is true that the licensing state guarantees the financial assets necessary for compensation. To construe this as an example of international liability accepted by states 71 seems, however, to overinterpret the provisions of the formal regime. Again, it has to be seen against the background of the extraordinary low limit ofliability set and the general intent to restrict transnational liability. In fact, state participation is not more than a compromise, aUowing the socialist countries to substitute the compulsory insurance of the operator with a state guarantee.
There is one other convention governing liability for transnational nuclear damage. Though this convention regarding the liability ofoperators of nuclear powered ships has never entered into force, 72 its liability regime facilitated the negotiations of several bilateral treaties governing port access of the two nuclear carriers 'Otto Hahn' and 'Savannah'. 611 In othcr cascs atatcs shippcd nuclcar material on warships, sec Lagorcc (n 67), 159"-6o and OECD Rcpon to f MCO LEG/X 3, 3.
69 Or, as thc case may bc, to thc Vicnna rcgimc and sirnilar national liability rcgulations. 70 Only thc US dclcgatc suggestcd the raising, as a corollary, ofthc limits ofthe nuclcar liability rcgimes, with special rcgard to the Vienna conventional rcgime, sec LEG/CON F3/C.1/SR.1, 2. agreements with each port country that led the US Government 74 to initiate the project of a global convention when the first nuclear carrier was under construction. Thus, the principal idea behind the convention was to provide for a legal regime that would facilitate the development of this new form of propulsion. Accordingly, liability would not be governed by private maritime law but by the principles of nuclear liability law. This time, however, not only suppliers 75 but also port states were pressing for high amounts of compensation. Their strong position explains why at the same time basically the same group of states, represented sometimes by the same delegates, 76 settled in Vienna for a minimum liability of a low U SS5m, whereas in Brussels they had agreed upon a US$1om Jimit. This meant of course that it was necessary also to provide for a state guarantee as it was out of the question that such an amount was insurable at that time. Though states carefully avoided any direct liability by wording the clause so as to oblige them only to provide the operator with the necessary financial assets, they nevertheless did, as in the case ofthe Brussels Supplementary Convention, accept some liability obligations in their capacity as licmsing states.
77 Whereas in this case the interests of possible victims have been represented, the interest in regime creation stemmed nevertheless from the few industrial states that desired to develop nuclear propulsion. The Paris/Brussels/London regime was a direct result of a threat by suppliers and carriers to boycott the programme. Tue nuclear ship Convention in addition faced some pressure from possible victim states. lt merits attention, however, that, though in a strong position, they did not manage to raise the available amount of compensation to a level of an estimated actual damage.
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All nuclear liability Conventions were intended to overcome practical obstacles hampering the development of the peaceful uses of atomic energy. Technological and energy policies simply could not have been perceived or developed without international rules. States bad to attract sufficient economic support for the programmes decided upon. Thus the liability regimes were primarily a device for implementation of these programmes. Herein lies the principal difference in political background when comparing them to the oil pollution compensation regime.
This conclusion is, to be sure, not true for the space liability Convention 79 which stipulates the unlimited and absolute international liability of the controlling state for all damage occurring on earth. Unlike in all other liability regimes, no private liability element exists. lt might therefore be considered a precedent for a future regime 74 The US govemment initiated a project in thc two atomic fora ofO EEC and 1 AEA. This explains the hasteof the traditional maritime law forum, the 1 M C; sec Röhreke, Hafaurg dn altnngttrillmtn Sdziffi, Hansa 1g6o, 291 and 
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The infiucncc ofthc suppliers Ui tobe seen, for instance, rcgarding an X l X, which stipulates that thc liability regime of thc convcntion-including the rule of channelling-will continue for twenry-five years aftcr expiry of thc conventional regime for the liccnsing state, sec Könz (n 73), 110.
governing international liability for transnational environmental damage. However, again the political background that renders the regime rather exceptional has tobe taken into account.
Outer space is an area of high military sensitivity. Both superpowers, as well as smaller states at that time able to engage in space activities, were not interested in extending the arms race into space. Hence, political and security considerations necessitated agreement by both military blocks on a legal regime of outer space at the peak time of the 'Cold War' . 80 The United Nations, as the only global and political international organization, appeared to be the proper forum for negotiating this objective.81 Thus, following a long procedural struggle, 82 serious negotiations on a space regime began in 1962 in the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. Whereas the Soviet Union was primarily interested in negotiations on general principles, 83 the USA favoured tackling the thorny issue ofliability for damage arising out of space activities.M As a political compromise, it was agreed to proceed with both the elaboration of principles 85 and a specific convention on liability as well as other specific issues. Contrary to nuclear Iiability law and possibly also that conceming maritime carriage ofoil, the dangerous activity in question was not going tobe hampered by liability issues. Participating states had instead to overcome severe political obstacles not blocking the activity itself, but threatening global security.
When in 1966, based upon the primary agreement of the two superpowers, 86 the Outer Space Treaty was adopted, 87 it was agreed, within the political context of the legal regime on outer space, that there should be a tight regime based on international responsibility of the controlling state not only for activities on its own behalfbut also for private activities carried out under its authority. The stipulation of the international liability of the controlling state 88 corroborates its obligation continuously to supervise and control governmental, as weil as private, space enterprises. lt has tobe seen in the framework of the space regime and not as a mere technical question ofhow to adjust the economic risk involved in space activities.
A private liability regime placing only subsidiary obligations on the Iicensing state, as established in the case ofnuclear energy, was never seriously discussed, 89 though it was 1 g63; for international liability sec para 8.
111 On thc domination ofthc bilateral relation ofthe two superpowers sec Courteix, 'La cooperation amcricanosovictique dans le domaine de l'exploration et de l'utilis.ation pacifiquc de l'espa.ce cxtra-atmosphcrique', A11111U1ire 90 States obviously considered space activities as primarily affecting not their economic but, on the contrary, their military and security interests. Accordingly, economic questions played but a minor role. There was practically no discussion on the need for a standard of absolute liability.
91 Furthermore, states settled eventually for unlimited liability, whereas the limit ofstate guarantee had been a prime issue during negotiations on nuclear liability. Space activities seemed for a long period to be confined to a few economically strong countries with all others considering themselves as possible victims. On the other hand, issues involving aspects of state sovereignty appeared to be important obstacles in this field. Whereas other liability conventions identify national courts as the forum for settlement of disputes, in the case of space disputes litigation is tobe initiated through cumbersome diplomatic channels and any decisions of arbitration commissions are not binding.
The highly politicized background of the decade-long negotiations, and the low ranking of economic issues, render the liability Convention for space activities a project strictly distinct from all other conventional liability regimes for transnational environmental damage. Though it is intended to avoid externalization of economic risks, the obligation of channelling liability on to the controlling state has, in an exceptional political context, been influenced prirnarily by rnilitary and security interests.
IV. Conclusion
As the number of Conventions is low and can in fact be further reduced to three categories oftreaties, one has tobe careful in generalizing. Focusing on the multitude of equally dangerous activities that are so far not governed by specific regirnes but instead by the inapplicable and therefore still unapplied general norms ofliability, what criteria for the development ofthese general norms may be derived from the preceeding survey? To begin with, without conventional regimes in all cases activities could not have been carried out as smoothly as has been possible under these regimes. Conventions thus avoided hampering and blocking the dangerous activities and reduced transaction costs. This survey, however, has revealed important differences between regimes and the heavy influence of political circumstances on regime mechanisms.
First of all, we are faced with two types of regimes stipulating different forms of international liability. Whereas the space liability regime expressly excludes private participation, nuclear liability law requires that liability of the operator be established. The key distinction explaining these differences seems to be the relation between military and security (i.e. political) aspects, on the one side, and economic aspects, based to a !arge extent on civil considerations, on the other.
Regarding space activities, military and civil components were at the time of regime creation, and are still today, heavily intertwined. Military and global-political con- siderations have always been a domain of govemmental interest. At the time of negotiations on liability for space activities, this interest obviously prevailed. Tue general space regime being in the centre of policy consideration, the impact of environmental and economic interests on the liability regime had been sharply reduced. Thus, some details of the regime, including the quality of providing for unlimited international liability, are based on a principal decision to extend direct state control into outer space. They may not be explained by environmental or economic pattems as was the case in the nuclear energy regimes.
Regarding the civil use of nuclear energy, the economic and the military political sphere bad at the time of regime-creation already been separated off. The civil use of nuclear energy was largely outside the scope of military considerations. F ollowing tests ofSoviet nuclear bombs, US President Eisenhower adopted in 1957 a policy restricting only military proliferation of nuclear technology whereas for civil purposes it was distributed relatively unhampered. Only some technical questions, including liability, had tobe solved. Therefore, negotiations were attended primarily by experts in liability and nuclear energy issues and proceeded in 'technical' fora. In the case of the nuclear ship Convention, however, by including nuclear powered warships in the liability regime, negotiators neglected the strict division between military and civil issues. Immediately, military political considerations 92 prevailed, as they did in space law, and the treaty itself never entered into force. The experts were, however, able to work out an applicable conventional regime based on the needs of an infant industry that involved high risk being dealt with in several bilateral agreements. States accepted, as in the other regimes on nuclear liability, public participation in the liability only as far as necessary and only in addition to the limited private liability. The fairly unanimous decision in favour of private liability, adapted to an economic activity designed for future operation under private control, was a matter of principle. The subsidiary liability of licensing states, at a preliminary stage ofthe industry, was but a matter ofpracticality.
Transport of dangerous substances is tobe considered an almost purely economic activity. A comparison with nuclear liability law discloses a second major distinction. Whereas in one case states engaged in subsidiary Iiability, in the other they did not. The US delegate to the 1969 Brussels Conference suggested as a criterion that state participation 'should only be considered if it could be shown that incremental insurance costs resulting from a traditional type though high Iimit maritime law solution were so huge as to make it uneconomic for vessel owners to continue in business'. 93 In other words, states were not prepared to engage in subsidiary liability as long as the industry in question itself is able to bear the burden of increased liability. Contrary to the case of space law, the consideration is here not one of principle, but of pure economic evaluation. lt is the same criterion as bad been applied in nuclear liability law. Only in one case was subsidiary state participation deemed necessary, in the other it was not.
Future attempts to regulate liability in other areas of dangerous activities will, therefore, have to focus primarily on the economic capacity of the risk-creating industry to bear the burden of increased liability. lt is of little use insisting on a formal 9'J Thc US dccision not to sign thc convcntion camc as a surprisc to thc US dclegation at thc confcrcncc, too, sec 93 LEG 1 ll/WP.1, 2-3·
